


November 8, 2019

# Pension Policy & the Decline in Fiscal Democracy

University of Chicago Policy Forum

The Pension Crisis: State and Local Pension Challenges


*Eugene Steuerle*



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# Introduction



# Summary

A time of extraordinary possibility, not austerity

Yet constrained by a disease unique to our time:

A huge decline in fiscal democracy


- Culmination of decades of effort to control an uncertain future
- Deficits only one symptom

Real reform requires looking far beyond deficits to the purposes of policy

# How today really is different


## Traditional Budget

*Revenues increase with economic growth.  
Spending increases only with new legislation.  
Real Dollars*



## Today's Budget

*Spending scheduled to grow automatically faster than revenues.  
Real Dollars*



# Many Deadly Consequences

## **Economic**

Budget for a declining nation, abandoning children & investment


Look not just to what is growing automatically but what is getting squeezed

Lack of flexibility to meet new economic conditions & needs

## **Political**

Decline in our democratic institutions


Real reform difficult when politicians must renege on promises



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
# Measuring the Decline in Federal Fiscal Democracy



# Decline in Fiscal Democracy at the Federal Level

## 'Fiscal democracy' is vanishing


After paying interest on the debt and accounting for mandatory spending, the percentage of federal receipts left to spend each year has been shrinking rapidly.



Source: Calculations based on data from OMB and CBO

# Health, Social Security and interest payments will dominate future budgets

Increase over 2018 budget by 2029 under current law, in billions of 2018 dollars




Notes: Other major health programs include CHIP and Affordable Care Act subsidies.

Source: Author's calculations from August 2019 Congressional Budget Office data.

THE WASHINGTON POST



# Measuring the Decline in Fiscal Democracy in Illinois




# From Decrying to Measuring Declines in State Fiscal Democracy

- Governors & lawmakers have long decried their lack of flexibility
  - “... the way the formulas now work, we will never catch up. **No matter how well we do, the current system is programmed to spend even more.**”


2005, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
  - “...I don’t think folks understand how limited you are in what you can cut. Everything that you can cut, we already have.”

Illinois State Senator Heather Steans
- But states rarely systematically evaluate
  - how much is out of current decision makers’ control
  - how budget pre-commitments are changing over time


# Restricted Spending, Share of Real Spending Growth (FY2015 vs. FY 2000)



# Illinois Growth in Restricted Spending (FY2015 vs FY2000)



# Illinois State Pension Policy



# Pension Plans Should be Assessed by Multiple Criteria

## **Most reports focus on**

Funding ratio

Making required contributions

## **But the purpose of pensions should be related to outcomes**

Rewarding and attracting the best young, workers

Promoting a dynamic workforce

Encouraging work at older ages, especially given population aging

Retirement income for short-term employees

Retirement income for long-term employees

Equal pay for equal work

# Grading Illinois State & Local Pension Plans

## Illinois

<b>Overall</b>	Overall Grade	Rewarding Younger Workers	Promoting a Dynamic Workforce	Encouraging Work at Older Ages	Retirement Income for Short-Term Employees	Retirement Income for Long-Term Employees	Making Required Contributions	Funding Ratio
All	C	C	B	F	C	B	D	D
Only new hires	D	F	B	C	F	B	D	D
Excludes new hires	C	C	B	F	B	B	D	D
<b>General State</b>	Overall Grade	Rewarding Younger Workers	Promoting a Dynamic Workforce	Encouraging Work at Older Ages	Retirement Income for Short-Term Employees	Retirement Income for Long-Term Employees	Making Required Contributions	Funding Ratio
All	C	C	C	D	B	A	C	F
Only new hires	C	F	B	A	F	A	C	F
Excludes new hires	C	C	C	F	A	A	C	F
☒ (IL01) Hired before Jan. 1, 2011 (Tier 1)	C	C	C	F	A	A	C	F
☒ (IL02) Hired on or after Jan. 1, 2011 (Tier 2)	C	F	B	A	F	A	C	F
<b>General Local</b>	Overall Grade	Rewarding Younger Workers	Promoting a Dynamic Workforce	Encouraging Work at Older Ages	Retirement Income for Short-Term Employees	Retirement Income for Long-Term Employees	Making Required Contributions	Funding Ratio
All	C	C	B	F	B	A	F	C
Only new hires	D	F	B	D	F	A	F	C
Excludes new hires	C	B	B	F	A	A	F	C
☒ (IL05) Hired before Jan. 1, 2011 (Tier 1)	C	B	B	F	A	A	F	C
☒ (IL06) Hired on or after Jan. 1, 2011 (Tier 2)	D	F	B	D	F	A	F	C

# Grading Illinois State & Local Pension Plans (cont.)

<b>Teachers</b>	Overall Grade	Rewarding Younger Workers	Promoting a Dynamic Workforce	Encouraging Work at Older Ages	Retirement Income for Short-Term Employees	Retirement Income for Long-Term Employees	Making Required Contributions	Funding Ratio
All	D	D	B	F	D	C	C	F
Only new hires	D	F	B	D	F	D	C	F
Excludes new hires	D	D	B	F	D	C	C	F
⊕ (IL09) Hired before Jan. 1, 2011 (Tier 1)	D	D	B	F	D	C	C	F
⊕ (IL10) Hired on or after Jan. 1, 2011 (Tier 2)	D	F	B	D	F	D	C	F
<b>Police and Fire</b>	Overall Grade	Rewarding Younger Workers	Promoting a Dynamic Workforce	Encouraging Work at Older Ages	Retirement Income for Short-Term Employees	Retirement Income for Long-Term Employees	Making Required Contributions	Funding Ratio
All	F	F	D	D	F	B	D	D
Only new hires	D	C	C	B	F	C	D	D
Excludes new hires	F	F	F	F	F	A	D	D
⊕ (IL03) State police and firefighters hired before Jan. 1, 2011 (SRS) (Tier 1)	F	F	D	F	F	B	C	F
⊕ (IL04) State police and firefighters hired on or after Jan. 1, 2011 (SRS) (Tier 2)	F	F	F	A	F	D	C	F
⊕ (IL07) Local sheriffs and deputies hired before Jan. 1, 2011 (IMRF) (Tier 1)	F	F	F	D	F	A	F	C
⊕ (IL08) Local sheriffs and deputies hired on or after Jan. 1, 2011 (IMRF) (Tier 2)	C	B	B	C	F	A	F	C



# Underfunding of State Pension Plans

## Pension Funding Status in Six States, 2016

*Funding ratio estimates, share contributed, and net amortization*

	US state total	CA	FL	IL	NY	TX	VA
<b>Funded ratio (%)<sup>a</sup></b>							
Pew	66	69	79	36	91	73	72
BEA	48	51	58	25	60	51	52
<b>Share contributed (%)<sup>b</sup></b>	88	82	101	75	152	71	101
<b>Net amortization (millions \$)<sup>c</sup></b>	-13.2	-2.9	0.0	-2.6	1.8	-1.6	0.0

**Sources:** Pew (2018); and US Census Bureau and BEA, "Financial Accounts of the United States," accessed via "State and Local Government Pension Funding Ratios, 2002 - 2016," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 4, 2018, [https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/pension/funding\\_ratio/map/](https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/pension/funding_ratio/map/).

**Notes:** BEA = US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Pew = Pew Charitable Trusts.

<sup>a</sup> "Funded ratio" is actuarial assets divided by actuarial accrued liabilities; differences between Pew and BEA estimates are based on the discount rates used in calculations.

<sup>b</sup> "Share contributed" is actual employer payments (state or other) toward current benefits plus unfunded liabilities divided by the recommended payment for the current year (i.e., the actuarially determined contribution) (Pew 2018).

<sup>c</sup> "Net amortization" is all contributions (employer, employee, and other, with interest) minus the net service cost and interest on the prior year's debt. Plans with negative net amortization can expect to see their funding gap increase (Pew 2018).

# Do Budgeteers & Actuaries Bear Some Responsibility?

For basing funding estimates on optimistic assumptions?

Do not account adequately for the “cost” of downside risks

Do not “insure” against downside risks


But doing so means earning Treasury rates of return

Count on market crashes to improve rates of return


For failing to reveal effective pension compensation to workers?

...Examples to follow for Illinois public school teachers


# Tier I, 25-Year-Old Hires, Constant 2014 Dollars




# Tier 2, 25-Year-Old Hires, Constant 2014 Dollars




# Expected Value of Lifetime Pension Benefits, net of employee contribs (age 25 hire)



# Annual Increment to Lifetime Benefits, net of employee contributions (age 25)






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# Summary



# Common Elements to Federal, State & State Pension Policy

## **For current federal and state budget policy**

Almost all spending growth going for pensions, health & interest payments

Explains failure to invest in children, workers, infrastructure, basic government

## **For future generations**

Huge shift of burdens to younger generations

Whether through higher taxes, fewer benefits, or negative state employer pension contributions for new workers

## **For transparency**

Continual political pressure to hide who will pay

Need for much better budgeting and actuarial accounting

No government entity reports on where net growth has gone or is going

No pension plan reports well how benefits relate to work in any one year

## **For our future**

A rich nation growing richer ...

That must first restore fiscal democracy to take advantage of its opportunities



# Reports on Fiscal Democracy & State Pension Plans

[Washington Post Article on 125% of Federal Revenue Growth Pre-Committed  
Dead Men Ruling-Book](#)

[Fiscal Democracy in the States: How Much Spending is on Auto-Pilot](#)

[Public pension simulator](#)

[Urban Institute State and Local Employee Pension Plan Database](#)

[The State of Retirement: Grading America's State and Local Pension Plans,  
Build Your Own Pension Plan,](#)

[Evaluating Retirement Income Security for Illinois Public School Teachers](#)