# Neighborhood Effects and Child Outcomes: Evaluating the Recent Empirical Literature

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#### Loose Ends from Discussion Last Week

Remainder of Chetty Slides: MTO Experiment, and Comparison to Observational Work

# Reminder: Chetty and Hendren (2018a) Estimation Strategy

- Given birth cohort s and CZ c, let p be the parents' percentile in the national income distribution.
- Let  $y_i$  denote the child's national income rank in adulthood.
- Authors assume linearity and estimate the following regression on the sample of children with permanent resident parents:

$$y_i = \alpha_{cs} + \psi_{cs} p_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $p_i$  is the percentile rank of child *i*'s parent in the national income distribution.

▶ Then, predict mean percentile ranks given *c*, *s*, and parent rank *p*:

$$\bar{y}_{pcs} = \hat{\alpha}_{cs} + \hat{\psi}_{cs}p$$

•  $\bar{y}_{pcs}$  is the measure of neighborhood quality.

# CH 2018: Definition of Exposure Effects

Thought experiment: randomly assign child of parental income rank p, to new neighborhood d, starting at age m, for remainder of childhood. Estimate:

 $y_i = \alpha_m + \beta_m \bar{y}_{pds} + \theta_i$ 

where  $\theta_i$  captures unobservable determinants of  $y_i$  (e.g., family inputs).

- Given random assignment at age m, and conditional on spending all years of childhood after m in destination d,  $\beta_m$  is the impact of a 1 percentile increase in the adult outcomes of permanent-d-resident children on i's adult outcome rank.
- Exposure effect at age m is  $\gamma_m = \beta_m \beta_{m+1}$ , the effect on  $y_i$  of spending the year from age m to age m + 1 in the destination.
- $\beta_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \gamma_m$  is the impact on  $y_i$  from random assignment to d at birth.

# CH 2018: Key Identifying Assumption

Obviously, migration is not random, and estimating the above equation using observational data will yield estimates:

$$b_m = \beta_m + \underbrace{\frac{cov(\theta_i, \bar{y}_{pds})}{var(\bar{y}_{pds})}}_{=}$$

Selection Bias

> This will bias estimated age-based exposure effects  $\gamma_m$  since:

$$b_{m} - b_{m+1} = \underbrace{\beta_{m} - \beta_{m+1}}_{\gamma_{m}} + \left( \left[ \frac{cov(\theta_{i}, \bar{y}_{pds})}{var(\bar{y}_{pds})} \right]_{m} - \left[ \frac{cov(\theta_{i}, \bar{y}_{pds})}{var(\bar{y}_{pds})} \right]_{m+1} \right)$$

- The authors solve this problem by assuming that the term cov(θ<sub>i</sub>, y
  <sub>pds</sub>)/var(y
  <sub>pds</sub>) is constant across ages. In other words, it is assumed that selection effects do not vary with the child's age at move.
- This rules out, e.g., differential preferences among parents by age of child for local amenities, such as school quality, that are not fully captured in adult income percentile rank y
  <sub>pds</sub>.

#### Estimation using Observational Data

- ▶ Define Δ<sub>odps</sub> = y
  <sub>pds</sub> y
  <sub>pos</sub> as the difference in mean income rank (at age 24) of permanent residents in the destination (d) location versus origin (o).
- The authors estimate:

$$y_i = \alpha_{qosm} + \sum_{m=9}^{30} b_m \mathbf{1}\{m_i = m\} \Delta_{odps} + \sum_{s=1980}^{1987} \kappa_s \mathbf{1}\{s_i = s\} \Delta_{odps} + \varepsilon$$

where  $\alpha_{\it qosm}$  is an (origin  $\times$  parent income decile  $\times$  birth cohort  $\times$  age) fixed effect.

- $\hat{b}_m$  is the average effect on age-24 income rank  $y_i$ , conditional on moving from o to d at age m, of a 1 percentile increase in  $\Delta_{odps}$ .
  - Assumed that within parent income deciles q, changes in this spread are driven entirely by y
    <sub>pds</sub>, not y
    <sub>ods</sub>.

# Results: $\hat{b}_m$ as function of age m



# Mapping Ranks to Dollars



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▶ Move age 0, assuming constant age effects (linearly decreasing *b<sub>m</sub>*)?

$$\underbrace{(0.126 + 0.044(23.5))}_{=1.16 \text{ percentiles}} \times \frac{52,016}{100} \approx \$604/\text{year}$$

# Mapping of Percentiles to Incomes in Chetty et al. (2018b)

▶ To map percentiles to dollars, Chetty et al. (2018b) estimate:

$$\bar{y}_{pc}^{\$} = \alpha + \beta_p \bar{y}_{pc} + \varepsilon$$

- $\bar{y}_{pc}^{\$}$ : Mean income of children of permanent residents in CZ c.
- $\bar{y}_{pc}$ : Mean income rank of children of permanent residents in CZ c
- Estimated across CZs in sample of children of permanent residents, separately by *parent* income rank *p*.
- $\hat{\beta}_{25} = \$818$ 
  - "A 1 percentile increase in income [rank] translates to an additional \$818 at age 26 on average."
- "The mean income of children with below-median income parents is \$26,091; therefore, a 1 percentile increase corresponds to approximately a  $\frac{818}{26,091} = 3.14\%$  increase in income."



This plot: CZ-level one-year exposure effects, against y
<sub>25,c</sub>.



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- This plot: CZ–level one–year exposure effects, against y
  <sub>25,c</sub>.
- "One year of exposure to Cleveland instead of average CZ raises child's income by 0.12 × 3.14% = 0.38%."
- ► For Los Angeles: -0.17 × 3.14% = -0.53%.



- Then, extrapolate to presence in CZ since birth.
  - $\blacktriangleright$  20 yrs. exposure to Cleveland: 20  $\times$  0.38% = 7.5% increase in adult income.
  - ▶ 20 yrs. exposure to L.A.:  $20 \times -0.53\% = 10.7\%$  decrease.

#### Estimation: Parametric Model

- Original model has more than 200,000 fixed effects  $\alpha_{qosm}$ .
- Authors also estimate a "more tractable" alternative: a parametric model estimating cohort- and age-specific slopes instead of fixed effects.

$$y_{i} = \sum_{s=1980}^{1988} \mathbf{1}\{s_{i} = s\} \left(\alpha_{s}^{1} + \alpha_{s}^{2} \bar{y}_{pos}\right) + \sum_{m=9}^{30} \mathbf{1}\{m_{i} = m\} \left(\zeta_{m}^{1} + \zeta_{m}^{2} p_{i}\right) + \sum_{m=9}^{30} b_{m} \mathbf{1}\{m_{i} = m\} \Delta_{odps} + \sum_{s=1980}^{1987} \kappa_{s}^{d} \mathbf{1}\{s_{i} = s\} \Delta_{odps} + \varepsilon_{i}$$

What is being controlled for here?

$$y_{i} = \sum_{s=1980}^{1988} \mathbf{1}\{s_{i} = s\} \left(\alpha_{s}^{1} + \alpha_{s}^{2} \bar{y}_{pos}\right) + \sum_{m=9}^{30} \mathbf{1}\{m_{i} = m\} \left(\zeta_{m}^{1} + \zeta_{m}^{2} p_{i}\right) + \sum_{m=9}^{30} b_{m} \mathbf{1}\{m_{i} = m\} \Delta_{odps} + \sum_{s=1980}^{1987} \kappa_{s}^{d} \mathbf{1}\{s_{i} = s\} \Delta_{odps} + \varepsilon_{i}$$

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• A separate slope and intercept for  $\bar{y}_{pos}$  within each birth cohort.

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- A separate slope and intercept for  $\bar{y}_{pos}$  within each birth cohort.
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- A separate slope and intercept for  $p_i$  within each moving age.
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- A separate slope and intercept for  $\bar{y}_{pos}$  within each birth cohort.
  - Intended to control for origin.
- A separate slope and intercept for  $p_i$  within each moving age.
  - Intended to control for disruption from moving (maybe varies with p<sub>i</sub>).
- Assumed that remaining variation in y<sub>i</sub> is due to changes in destination quality.

# Results: Original Model (for comparison)



#### Results: Parametric Model



#### Discussion: Parametric Model with Family Fixed Effects

Authors address time-varying selection possibility by adding family fixed effect:

$$y_{i} = \sum_{s=1980}^{1988} \mathbf{1}\{s_{i} = s\} \left(\alpha_{s}^{1} + \alpha_{s}^{2} \bar{y}_{pos}\right) + \sum_{m=9}^{30} \mathbf{1}\{m_{i} = m\} \left(\zeta_{m}^{1} + \zeta_{m}^{2} p_{i}\right) + \sum_{m=9}^{30} b_{m} \mathbf{1}\{m_{i} = m\} \Delta_{odps} + \sum_{s=1980}^{1987} \kappa_{s}^{d} \mathbf{1}\{s_{i} = s\} \Delta_{odps} + \bar{\theta}_{fam} + \varepsilon_{i}$$

Regression is now estimated entirely on sample of families with 
 2 children.

 Intuitively, family-level mean effects are taken out.

#### Discussion: What do Family Fixed Effects Capture?

- Suppose we can write  $\varepsilon_i = \bar{\theta}_{fam} + e_i$ 
  - $\bar{\theta}_{fam}i$ : fixed family inputs (e.g., culture, parents' human capital, etc.)
  - e<sub>i</sub>: variable inputs (e.g., wealth shocks, noise)
- ► The selection assumption is that  $\frac{cov(\varepsilon_i, \Delta_{odps})}{var(\Delta_{odps})}$  is constant in age.
- ► Including family fixed effects controls for  $\bar{\theta}_{fam}$ , e.g., if higher-skill families choose better neighborhoods at earlier ages.
- ► To interpret results as "no selection" still need  $\frac{cov(e_i, \Delta_{odps})}{var(\Delta_{odps})}$  constant in age.
  - This can be violated, e.g., if shocks to wealth are correlated with child age.
  - One such wealth shock correlated with first child's age: the birth of a second child!
  - E.g., could be meaningful differences between families where kids are 4 years vs. 8 years apart.

#### Results: Parametric with Family Fixed Effects (A) With Family Fixed Effects



Age of Child when Parents Move

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Loose Ends from Discussion Last Week

Remainder of Chetty Slides: MTO Experiment, and Comparison to Observational Work

Chetty et al. (2016) — the MTO study

- Chetty et al. (2016) study the role of exposure to better neighborhoods on children in the context of the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment.
- MTO offered randomly selected families housing vouchers to move from high-poverty housing projects to lower-poverty neighborhoods.
   Low-income, low-human capital sample.
- Previous work (e.g., Ludwig et al. 2013) showed MTO improved adult mental and physical health, but had no consistent effects on adult economic self-sufficiency.
  - Effects on educational attainment and earnings also previously estimated to be small (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011).

# Results of Chetty et al. (2016)

Chetty et al. (2016) find:

- Moving when young (before age 13) increases college attendance and earnings in adulthood.
  - ► ITT estimate: \$1,624 higher annual incomes (experimental vs. control).
- Moving as an adolescent has slightly negative impacts on these life outcomes (though imprecise estimates).
- Substantial noncompliance among voucher recipients (roughly 50% takeup)
   most results presented are reduced-form "Intent to Treat" (ITT) estimates.
- Treatment-on-Treated (TOT) use voucher takeup as instrument for neighborhood effects among sample of movers, and are for this reason roughly twice as large (\$3,477).
  - Pinto (2019) treats this noncompliance as reflective of rational choice among voucher recipients, and uses this framework to identify neighborhood effects (instead of voucher effects) for adult labor market outcomes of MTO.

# Patterns of Noncompliance in MTO (Pinto, 2019)



Figure 1: Neighborhood Relocation by Voucher Assignment and Compliance

#### Estimation Details: Chetty et al. (2016)

▶ ITT regression in Chetty et al. (2016):

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_E^{ITT} E x p_i + \beta_S^{ITT} S 8_i + \delta s_i + \varepsilon_i$$

- Exp<sub>i</sub> = 1{randomly assgn. experimental voucher}
- $S8_i = 1$ {randomly assgn. Section 8 voucher}
- $s_i$  = randomization site fixed effect.
- 2SLS regression for TOT effects:

$$y_i = \alpha_T + \beta_E^{TOT} \widehat{\text{TakeExp}}_i + \beta_S^{TOT} \widehat{\text{TakeS8}}_i + \delta_T s_i + \varepsilon_i^T e$$

where Exp<sub>i</sub> and S8<sub>i</sub> instrument for TakeExp<sub>i</sub> and TakeS8<sub>i</sub>, respectively.

### What does the estimated effect measure?

- Consider a simplified case where randomization is not site-specific and there is only an experimental treatment. Let Y denote the outcome.
- ▶ Let *D* denote treatment (using a voucher), and *Z* denote the instrument (random assignment to the voucher).
- Assume standard Imbens and Angrist (1996) "monotonicity" assumptions:
  - Exogeneity:  $Z \perp (Y_0, Y_1, D_0, D_1)$
  - Relevance:  $Cov(D, Z) \neq 0$
  - Monotonicity:  $D_1 \ge D_0$
- Then:

$$\beta_{IV} \equiv \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Y, Z)}{\mathsf{Cov}(D, Z)} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = 1] - \mathbb{E}[Y \mid Z = 0]}{\mathbb{E}[D \mid Z = 1] - \mathbb{E}[D \mid Z = 0]}$$

Can show:

$$\beta_{IV} = \mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D_1 = 1, D_0 = 0] = \mathsf{LATE}$$

- "Treatment on the Treated" in Chetty et al. (2016) is LATE for voucher compliers.
- ▶ Relevant for policy interpretation to understand who is the complier group.

# How are Compliers Different? (Pinto, 2019)

	Full Sample				Experimental Group			Section 8 Group			
	Control	d Experimental vs. Control		Section 8 vs. Control		Experimental	Comparison Compliers vs. Not		Section 8	Comparison Compliers vs. Not	
	Group					Compliers			Compliers		
	Mean	Diff	p-val	Diff	p-val	Mean	Diff	p- $val$	Mean	Diff	p- $val$
Variable	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Family											
Disable Household Member	0.15	0.01	0.31	0.00	0.82	0.15	-0.04	0.34	0.13	-0.06	0.23
No teens (ages 13-17) at baseline	0.63	-0.03	0.12	-0.01	0.55	0.65	0.10	0.00	0.66	0.11	0.00
Household size is 2 or smaller	0.21	0.01	0.48	0.01	0.39	0.26	0.08	0.04	0.23	0.03	0.56
Sociability											
No family in the neighborhood	0.65	-0.02	0.35	0.00	1.00	0.65	0.03	0.06	0.65	0.01	0.57
Respondent reported no friends	0.41	-0.00	0.78	-0.01	0.56	0.44	0.06	0.02	0.41	0.02	0.48
Chat with neighbor	0.53	-0.01	0.60	-0.03	0.19	0.50	-0.05	0.04	0.51	0.01	0.77
Watch for neighbor children	0.57	-0.02	0.31	-0.03	0.16	0.51	-0.07	0.00	0.55	0.03	0.36
Neighborhood											
Victim last 6 months (baseline)	0.41	0.01	0.41	0.01	0.45	0.45	0.05	0.08	0.45	0.06	0.09
Living in neighborhood $> 5$ yrs.	0.60	0.00	0.97	0.02	0.28	0.59	-0.03	0.17	0.59	-0.08	0.00
Unsafe at night (baseline)	0.50	-0.02	0.27	-0.00	1.00	0.52	0.08	0.00	0.54	0.10	0.00
Moved due to gangs	0.78	-0.01	0.52	-0.02	0.24	0.79	0.04	0.00	0.78	0.04	0.00
Schooling											
Has a GED (baseline)	0.20	-0.03	0.04	0.00	0.81	0.18	0.03	0.46	0.20	0.00	0.98
Completed high school	0.35	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.47	0.41	0.02	0.57	0.39	0.06	0.10
Enrolled in school (baseline)	0.16	0.00	0.95	0.02	0.22	0.19	0.07	0.10	0.19	0.04	0.45
Never married (baseline)	0.62	-0.00	0.97	-0.02	0.36	0.66	0.06	0.00	0.63	0.05	0.02
Teen pregnancy	0.25	0.01	0.41	0.01	0.69	0.27	0.02	0.49	0.29	-0.09	0.05
Missing GED and H.S. diploma	0.07	-0.01	0.12	-0.01	0.54	0.04	-0.03	0.50	0.06	-0.01	0.80
Welfare/economics											
AFDC/TANF Recipient	0.74	0.02	0.34	0.00	0.85	0.78	0.04	0.00	0.78	0.08	0.00
Car Owner	0.17	-0.01	0.65	-0.01	0.43	0.19	0.04	0.26	0.17	0.04	0.48
Adult Employed (baseline)	0.25	0.02	0.28	0.01	0.75	0.26	-0.01	0.84	0.27	0.03	0.51

# 2SLS Case: What does $\hat{\beta}_{F}^{TOT}$ identify?

Now consider the following 2SLS specification, accounting for site-specific randomization using fixed effects S<sub>i</sub>:

$$Y_{i} = \alpha + \beta_{E}^{TOT} \widehat{D}_{i} + \delta S_{i} + \varepsilon_{i}$$
$$D_{i} = \pi + \gamma Z_{i} + \xi S_{i} + \nu_{i}$$

Adjust assumptions to be conditional on X:

- Exogeneity:  $(Y_0, Y_1, D_0, D_1) \perp Z \mid \boldsymbol{S}$
- Relevance:  $\mathbb{P}[D = 1 \mid Z = 1] \neq \mathbb{P}[D = 1 \mid Z = 0]$
- Monotonicity:  $\mathbb{P}[D_1 \ge D_0 \mid \boldsymbol{S}] = 1$
- Overlap:  $\mathbb{P}[Z = 1 \mid \boldsymbol{S}] \in (0, 1)$  (obviously satisfied here).

• Can point identify conditional LATE by within-site  $\beta_{IV}$ :

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid T = c, \boldsymbol{S} = s] \equiv \mathsf{LATE}(s)$$

# 2SLS Case: What does $\hat{\beta}_{F}^{TOT}$ identify?

Can show that aggregated LATE is:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid T = c] = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\mathsf{LATE}(\boldsymbol{S}) \cdot \mathbb{P}[T = c \mid \boldsymbol{S}]}{\mathbb{P}[T = c]}\right]$$

- A weighted average of effects on compliers across locations, where the weights are the share of compliers in each location.
- Compliance varies widely across sites (Pinto, 2019):

Table 5: Compliance Rates by Site

Site	All Sites	Baltimore	$\operatorname{Boston}$	Chicago	Los Angeles	New York
Experimental Compliance Rate Section 8 Compliance Rate	$47 \ \% \\ 59 \ \%$	$58 \% \\ 72 \%$	$46 \% \\ 48 \%$	${34}\ \%\ {66}\ \%$	67 % 77 %	$45\% \\ 49\%$

This tables presents the fraction of voucher recipients that used the voucher (compliance rate) to relocate by site.

# Results of Chetty et al. (2016)



# How to Reconcile these Results?



#### MTO study

**Observational Study** 

- MTO study finds that moving after age 13 harmful to children, while observational study finds that moving to a better neighborhood is valuable at least until age 23.
- Treatment-control comparison is different between the two groups.
  - MTO study: compares voucher-receipt groups to no-voucher control group.
    - Although, substantial ( $\sim$ 19%) rates of movers in control group (Pinto, 2019).
  - Observational study: comparisons only within sample of movers.

# Implications for Disruption Effects of Moving

- One way to reconcile these results is to say the disruption cost of moving is constant in age, i.e.  $\kappa_a = \kappa$  for all a.
  - Chetty et al. (2016): "The MTO experimental design cannot be used to conclusively establish that childhood exposure to a better environment has a causal effect on long-term outcomes because the ages at which children move are perfectly correlated with their length of exposure ... as a result, we cannot distinguish differences in disruption effects by age at the time of a move from an age-invariant disruption cost coupled with an exposure effect." (pg. 858)
  - In this statement, possibilities in between also possible: For example, weak causal effect of exposure combined with slightly increasing exposure effect.
- Constant κ seems implausible e.g., hard to imagine significant social disruption effects for infants. Plausible that effects of social disruption during adolescence are large.
- Could also have κ<sub>a</sub> increasing in a. Then regressions with age-at-move fixed effects would "net out" the effect.

# Implications for Disruption Effects of Moving

- Both situations still challenge the interpretation of estimates from the second CH study (2018b) as the causal effect of a county; at best they are causal effects conditional on moving away from home.
- Adds an important caveat for interpreting the county-level estimates and identification of "opportunity bargains" in Chetty and Hendren (2018b).
- The MTO study suggests that such moves could actually be harmful for adolescents; comparisons conditional on moving are not the relevant question for a family deciding *whether* to move.
- Interpreting the effects presented in CH (2018b) as "the effect of growing up in each county" requires extrapolating estimates estimated on sample of older children to apply equally since birth.

# Summary – Empirical Work

- Rather than being purely a criticism, the point of these slides is to say that the Chetty work does not address and leaves open some of the most interesting questions about the impacts of neighborhoods on child outcomes.
  - 1. Evaluated in dollars (not ranks), what is the shape of  $\gamma_m$  across moving-age profiles? Is it concave, as a theory of dynamic complementarity would suggest?
  - 2. What are the interactions between the decision of migration destination, the age of children, local amenities, and shocks to parental income?

#### Appendix

# Appendix: Slides covered Last Week Included for reference.

Motivation: Unanswered questions about the role of neighborhoods in intergenerational mobility.

What are estimated neighborhood effects really measuring?

- Characteristics of neighborhood (schools, safety, housing stock, air quality, etc.)
- Characteristics of the child (e.g., age) in interaction with the above.
- Choices in measurement can influence estimated effects
  - Evolution of incomes over life cycle  $\Rightarrow$  timing of measurement matters.
  - Ability to observe children at early moving ages.
  - Averaging due to missing data in some years might also prevent studying influence of shocks.
  - Mapping of income rank to welfare.

# Motivation: Unanswered questions about the role of neighborhoods in intergenerational mobility.

- Recent work by Chetty, Hendren, and coauthors has demonstrated importance of neighborhoods in determining intergenerational mobility in incomes.
- The results, though important, leave unanswered several crucial questions in the study of intergenerational mobility:
  - 1. What is the role of neighborhood *characteristics* (e.g., crime, education, HH size, etc.) in shaping their impact on mobility?
  - 2. What do the results tell us about the timing of investment in children?
- This presentation will focus on (2). I will discuss the identification strategy of the Chetty studies, and isolate some questions they leave open.
- After discussing the Chetty et al., work, I present a model sketch attempting to integrate neighborhood effects with the theory of dynamic complementarity in childhood skill formation.

#### Motivation: Effects of Place on Lifetime Outcomes

$$y_i = \sum_{a=1}^{A} \left[ \mu_{c(i,a)} - \kappa_a \mathbf{1} \{ c(i,a) \neq c(i,a-1) \} \right] + \theta_i$$

- ▶ *y<sub>i</sub>*: child *i*'s outcome (e.g., income) in adulthood.
- c(i, a): place c in which child i lives at age a = 1, ..., A of childhood.

•  $\mu_{c(i,a)}$ : Effect of living in *c* at age *a*.

- $\kappa_a$ : one-time disruption cost of moving at age *a*.
- $\theta_i$ : Effect of other factors (e.g., family inputs) on  $y_i$ .

Reduced-form framework can give us mean effects, but leaves several crucial questions unanswered:

- 1. How does  $\kappa_a$  vary with age and location? Will discuss the implications/plausibility of what the Chetty studies, taken together, imply about disruption effects.
- 2. How could measurement error in  $y_i$ , or in parent incomes, affect the results? What assumptions are required for this not to matter?
- 3. Assumption of no complementarities of neighborhood effects across years.

### C&H 2018: Measure of Neighborhood Quality

Typically, studies of intergenerational mobility attempt to estimate the elasticity between child income and parent income (the IGE), β<sub>n</sub>, in:

$$Y_{in}^{c} = \alpha_{n} + \beta_{n} Y_{in}^{p} + \varepsilon_{in}$$

- This study (Chetty and Hendren, QJE 2018a) instead aims to estimate the effects of "better" neighborhoods on the IGE. It therefore requires a measure of neighborhood quality.
- This measure is calculated using children of "permanent residents," defined as parents who stay in the same commuting zone (CZ) over the sample period (1996 to 2012).

# C&H 2018: Measuring Neighborhood Quality

- Given birth cohort s and CZ c, let p be the parents' percentile in the national income distribution.
- ▶ Let *y<sub>i</sub>* denote the child's national income rank in adulthood.
- Authors assume linearity and estimate the following regression on the sample of children with permanent resident parents:

$$y_i = \alpha_{cs} + \psi_{cs} p_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $p_i$  is the percentile rank of child *i*'s parent in the national income distribution.

▶ Then, predict mean percentile ranks given *c*, *s*, and parent rank *p*:

$$\bar{y}_{pcs} = \hat{\alpha}_{cs} + \hat{\psi}_{cs}p$$

•  $\bar{y}_{pcs}$  is the measure of neighborhood quality.

#### CH 2018: Motivation of Linearity Assumption



FIGURE I

Mean Child Income Rank versus Parent Income Rank for Children Raised in Chicago

#### CH 2018: Motivation of Linearity Assumption



# CH 2018: Definition of Exposure Effects

- Consider thought experiment: randomly assign child of parental income rank p, to new neighborhood d, starting at age m, for remainder of childhood.
- Linear regression of child's adult national income distribution rank y<sub>i</sub> on permanent resident mean outcome rank y
  <sub>pds</sub>:

 $y_i = \alpha_m + \beta_m \bar{y}_{pds} + \theta_i$ 

where  $\theta_i$  captures unobservable determinants of  $y_i$  (e.g., family inputs).

- Given random assignment at age m, and conditional on spending all years of childhood after m in destination d,  $\beta_m$  is the impact of a 1 percentile increase in the adult outcomes of permanent-d-resident children on i's adult outcome rank.
- Exposure effect at age m is  $\gamma_m = \beta_m \beta_{m+1}$ , the effect on  $y_i$  of spending the year from age m to age m + 1 in the destination.
- $\beta_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \gamma_m$  is the impact on  $y_i$  from random assignment to d at birth.

# CH 2018: Key Identifying Assumption

Obviously, migration is not random, and estimating the above equation using observational data will yield estimates:

$$b_m = \beta_m + \underbrace{\frac{cov(\theta_i, \bar{y}_{pds})}{var(\bar{y}_{pds})}}_{0}$$

Selection Bias

> This will bias estimated age-based exposure effects  $\gamma_m$  since:

$$b_{m} - b_{m+1} = \underbrace{\beta_{m} - \beta_{m+1}}_{\gamma_{m}} + \left( \left[ \frac{cov(\theta_{i}, \bar{y}_{pds})}{var(\bar{y}_{pds})} \right]_{m} - \left[ \frac{cov(\theta_{i}, \bar{y}_{pds})}{var(\bar{y}_{pds})} \right]_{m+1} \right)$$

- The authors solve this problem by assuming that the term cov(θ<sub>i</sub>, y
  <sub>pds</sub>)/var(y
  <sub>pds</sub>) is constant across ages. In other words, it is assumed that selection effects do not vary with the child's age at move.
- This rules out, e.g., differential preferences among parents by age of child for local amenities, such as school quality, that are not fully captured in adult income percentile rank y
  <sub>pds</sub>.

#### Estimation using Observational Data

- Consider a family that moves from origin *o* to destination *d*. Define ∆<sub>odps</sub> = y
  <sub>pds</sub> - y
  <sub>pos</sub> as the difference in mean income rank (at age 24) of permanent residents in the destination location versus origin.
- The authors estimate:

$$y_i = \alpha_{qosm} + \sum_{m=9}^{30} b_m \mathbf{1}\{m_i = m\} \Delta_{odps} + \sum_{s=1980}^{1987} \kappa_s \mathbf{1}\{s_i = s\} \Delta_{odps} + \varepsilon$$

where  $\alpha_{qosm}$  is an (origin  $\times$  parent income decile  $\times$  birth cohort  $\times$  age) fixed effect.

- $\hat{b}_m$  is the average effect on age-24 income rank  $y_i$ , conditional on moving from o to d at age m, of a 1 percentile increase in  $\Delta_{odps}$ .
  - Assumed that within parent income deciles q, changes in this spread are driven entirely by y
    <sub>pds</sub>, not y
    <sub>ods</sub>.

#### Results



#### (A) Semi-Parametric Estimates

#### Are the Results Interpretable?

Set aside the selection assumption. What do the results imply?

- Linear relationship between  $b_m$  and age at move m implies exposure effect  $\gamma_m = b_{m+1} b_m$  is roughly constant with respect to age at move.
  - This seems inconsistent at first glance with the notion of dynamic complementarity, which would imply convexity in the relationship and declining  $\gamma_m$  with age.
- Interpretation of constant γ depends on the mapping of a one-percentile change in income rank to *actual* (dollar-valued) changes in adult income.
  - For example: income distrbutions are skewed rightward (Neal and Rosen 2000), so the magnitude of a 1 percentile change is much larger at high incomes.
- Move from p10 to p11 neighborhood and move from p90 to p91 neighborhood (based on y
  <sub>pcs</sub>) have same Δ<sub>odps</sub>, so would produce same rank shift in y<sub>i</sub>. Much larger in dollar terms for children of the rich.
- Authors address this question in Chetty and Hendren (2018b) by estimating:

$$\bar{y}_{pc}^{\$} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 \bar{y}_{pc} + \varepsilon$$

Estimate  $\hat{\lambda}_1$  is dollar value of 1 percentile increase in  $\bar{y}_{pc}$ . Cross–county regression estimated separately within percentiles.

#### Income Distribution – Ranks to Levels



#### What does the selection assumption imply for behavior?

- One implication is that parents' preferences over local amenities that are (a.) heterogeneous across locations, and (b.) not perfectly collinear with  $\bar{y}_{pcs}$ , do not change with the age of children. Many local factors could violate this assumption: school quality, safety, etc.
- In particular, this assumption could be violated for parents of very young children, who may be more likely to be concerned about school quality or local safety. Earliest age at which moves are observed in this study is 8 (third grade).

# Possibility of interaction between selection and measurement error.

- Incomes are measured with error in the study. Sample and variable definitions:
  - Sample of children: those born between 1980-1988.
  - Measure of parent income: average of tax records from 1996-2000.
- Children are therefore between 8 and 12 years old at youngest when parent incomes are measured. They are between 16 and 20 at oldest.
- Large literature suggesting that the birth of a first child is a significant shock to incomes (recently: Larrimore, Mortenson, and Splinter 2016, Splinter 2019, Kleven et al. 2018).
- Migration shown to be substantially influenced by income prospects (Kennan and Walker, 2011).
- My point: if fluctuations in income (a.) vary systematically with child age in early years of childhood, and (b.) influence the choice of migration destination, then the Chetty assumption does not hold in general for early years, and the use of average parental incomes at later ages of childhood masks important variation in early years of childhood.

# Justification of Constant-in-Age Selection Assumption

The authors perform several tests to justify this assumption. Suppose we can write selection as:

$$heta_i = ar{ heta}_i + ar{ heta}_i$$

where  $\bar{\theta}_i$  represents fixed family inputs (e.g., genetics) and  $\tilde{\theta}_i$  is a residual.

- ▶ To address age-varying selection due to  $\bar{\theta}_i$ , the authors use two strategies. Both leave the estimates qualitatively unchanged:
  - Add family fixed effects (identifying off of siblings)
  - Control for changes in parents' income and marital status.